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or most of the last two decades, citizenship has barely appeared as a central
X  issue on the political agenda in Britain. To the extent that it has, or has been 
associated largely with debates about immigration and emigration. Who was entitled 
to be a citizen? Who was allowed to be a member of the English political community?
Something however has changed. Citizenship is now a word on the lips of politicians 
and academics alike, in Britain - and in West or East - more generally. It has become a 
fundamental concern to the left as well as the right. What prompts the concern with 
citizenship? What is at stake in the debate between left and right? Why are the
competing political ideologies of our times now claiming citizenship for themselves?
From the ancient world to the present day, all forms of citizenship have had certain 
common attributes. Citizenship has meant a certain reciprocity of rights against, and 
duties towards, the community. Citizenship has entailed membership, membership of 
the community in which one lives ones life. And membership has invariably involved 
degrees of participation in the community. The question of who should participate and 
at what level is a question as old as the ancient world itself. There is much significant 
history in the attempt to restrict the extension of citizenry to certain groups: among 
others, owners of property, white men, educated men, men, those with particular 
skills and occupations, adults. There is also a telling story in the various conceptions 
and debates about what is to count as citizenship and in particular what is to count as 
participation in the community.
If citizenship entails membership in the community and membership implies forms of 
social participation, then it is misleading to think of citizenship primarily in
relationship to class or part, as some have done in recent theoretical exchanges.
Citizenship is about the involvement of people in the community in which they live; 
and people have been barred from citizenship on grounds of gender, race and age 
among many other factors. To analyse citizenship as if it were a matter of the 
inclusion or exclusion of, for example, social classes is to eclipse the view of a variety 
of dimensions of social life which have been central to the struggle over citizenship. In 
light of this fact, the debate about citizenship requires us to think about the very 
nature of the conditions of membership and participation in the community.
If citizenship involves the struggle for membership and participation in the 
community, then its analysis involves examining the way in which different groups, 
classes and movements struggle to gain degrees of autonomy and control over their
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lives in the face of various forms of stratification, hierarchy and political oppression. 
A concern with citizenship in its fullest sense is, I hold, coterminous with a concern for 
issues posed by feminism, the black movement, ecological pressure groups (concerned 
with the moral status of animals and nature), the labour movements, among others. 
Different social movements have raised different questions about the nature and 
dimensions of citizenship. As one critic aptly put it, »citizenship rights are the 
outcome of social movements which aim either to extend or to defend the definition of 
social membership... The boundaries which define citizenship ... ultimately define 
membership of a social group or collectivity.«
A reflection on the nature of citizenship rights helps to put the issues a little more 
sharply, and reveals a direct connection between citizenship rights, freedom, and the 
conditions under which people can develop their own activities. Citizenship rights are, 
above all, entitlements-, that is to say, they establish a sphere - a legitimate sphere - for 
individuals to pursue their own actions or activities without risk of arbitrary or unjust 
political intervention. If the early attempts to achieve citizenship rights involved 
struggle for autonomy or independence from the locale in which one was born and 
from prescribed occupations, later struggles involved such things as freedom of speech, 
expression, belief and association, and freedom for women in - and bayond - 
marriage. Citizenship rights can be thought of as a measure of the autonomy a citizen 
can enjoy. For the autonomy of the citizen can be represented by that bundle of rights 
which he or she can take advantage of as a result of his or her status as »free and 
equal« members of society. To unpack the domain of rights is to unpack both the 
rights citizens formally enjoy and the conditions under which citizens rights are 
actually realised or enacted. Citizenship rights invoke questions not only about the 
formal status of rights - rights available to citizens before the law - but also about the 
actual conditions which make or do not make possible the use or enjoyment or rights 
as such. The question of citizenship creates a double focus - on both the formal and 
substantive issues of liberty: the relationship between liberty as a principle and as 
practice in the wider community. Citizenship puts the question of individual 
autonomy, interdependence and constraint at the centre of political discussion.
What is at stake can be seen clearly in the exchanges between the new right and its, 
above all, new left critics. To take the position of new right first. The new right, as is 
well known, is committed to the classic liberal doctrine that the collective good (or the 
good of all individuals) can be properly realised in most cases only by private 
individuals acting in competitive isolation and pursuing their sectoral aims with 
minimal state interference. At root, the new right is concerned with how to advance 
the cause of »liberalism« against »democracy«. On this view, a government can only 
legitimately intervene in society to enforce general rules - rules which broadly protect, 
in John Locke’s words, »life, liberty and estate« of the citizen. Hayek, one of the 
leading advocates of these ideas, is unequivocal about this: a free liberal order is 
incompatible with the enactment of rules which specify how people should use the 
means at their disposal. Governments become coercive if they interfere with peoples’ 
own capacity to determine their objectives. The prime example Hayek gives of such 
coercion is legislation which attempts to alter the material position of particular people
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or enforce distributive of »social« justice. Distributive justice always imposes on some 
another citizen’s conception of merit or desert. It requires the allocation of resources 
by a central authority acting as if  it knew what people should receive for their efforts 
and how they should behave. The value of individual’s services can, however, only 
justly be determined by their fellows in and through a decision-making system which 
does not interfere with their knowledge, choices and decisions. And there is only one 
mechanism sufficiently sensitive for determining collective choice on an individual 
basis - the free market. The free market is the key condition of the liberty of citizens. 
When operated within the framework of a minimal state, it becames constitutive of 
the nature of citizenship itself.
The left, or new left, attack on this position is also by now familiar. The extent to 
which individuals are »free« in contemporary liberal - or socialist - democracies is 
open to question. To enjoy liberty means not only to enjoy equality before the law, 
important though this unquestionably is, but also to have capacities (the material and 
cultural resources) to be able to choose between different courses of action. The 
famous cynical comment on equality before the law - »The doors of the Court of 
Justice stand open to all, like the doors of the Ritz Hotel« - applies equally to 
democratic participation and access to ordinary amenities. Without a concrete content
- as particular freedoms - liberty can scarcely be said to have profound consequences 
for everyday life. If liberals or neo-liberals were to take these issues seriously, they 
would discover that massive numbers of individuals are restricted systematically - for 
want of a complex mix of resources and opportunities - from participating actively in 
political and civil life. Inequalities of class, sex and race substantially hinder the extent 
to which it can legitimately be claimed that individuals are »free and equal«.
While it is, I would argue, necessary to pursue the implications of citizenship rights for 
the organisational structure of society as well as of the state, as the left critics of the 
new right argue, this line of reasoning is vulnerable to criticism. In particular, it is 
vulnerable to the charge of having attempted to resolve prematurely the highly 
complex relations among individual liberty, distributional matters (questions of social 
justice) and democratic processes. This becomes clearest in the left’s affirmation and 
advocacy collective decision-making. By focussing squarely on an extension (at least in 
theory) of democracy, above all other considerations, Marxist (and socialist) political 
theses tend to leave the specification of the relations among liberty, distributional 
questions and democratic processes to the ebb and flow of democratic negotiation. 
From Marx to Lenin to Marcuse this is a constant and recurring theme (in some of 
their most sympathetic work anyway). The people are to become sovereign (via, 
respectively, the Commune, Soviets, or Parliament). The people are to become the 
rulers: the governors of their own affairs - without limit, or so the argument runs.
But it is precisely in criticising such a standpoint that the new right thinkers are at 
their most compelling. Should there be limits on the power of the demos to change or 
alter political circumstance? Should the nature and scope of the liberty of individuals 
and minorities be left to democratic decision? Should there be clear constitutional 
guidelines which both enable and limit democratic operations? The new right 
recognises the possibility of severe tension between individual liberty, collective
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decision-making and the institutions and process of democracy. By not systematically 
addressing these issues, the left, in contrast, has all too often, hastily put aside the 
problems. In making democracy at all levels the primary social objective, the left has 
relied upon »democratic reason« - a wise a good democratic will - for the 
determination of just and positive political outcomes. Can an essentially democratic 
demos be relied upon? Can one assume that the democratic will would be wise and 
good? Hayek and other new right thinkers have suggested good grounds for at least 
pausing on this matter.
It was precisely around these issues that the new right - in the Anglo-American world 
at least - generated so much political capital by directly acknowledging the uncertain 
outcomes of democratic politics - the ambiguous results, for instance, of the 
well-intentioned democratic welfare state. By highlighting that democracy can lead to 
bureaucracy, red-tape, surveillance and excessive infringement of individual options 
(and not just in Soviet dominated societies), they have struck a chord with the actual 
experience of those in routine contact with certain branches of the modern state, 
experience which by no means necessarily makes people more optimistic about 
collective decision-making. The question is: how can one think through the meaning 
of citizenship as a »free and equal« status, without falling prey to some of the serious 
objections put by the new right? How can individuals enjoy a status as »free and 
equal« in the context of the general concern for the extension of democracy?
If enhanced political participation is embedded in a legal framework that protects and 
nurtures individuals as »free and equal« citizens, it is possible to provide a plausible 
answer to these questions. One cannot escape the necessity, I believe, of recognising 
the importance of a number of fundamental liberal traits: concerning the centrality, in 
principle, of an »impersonal« structure of public power, of a constitution to help 
guarantee and protect rights, of a diversity of power centres within and outside the 
state, of mechanisms to promote competition and debate between alternative political 
platforms.
In many countries, West and East, the limits of »government« are, of course, 
explicitly defined in constitutions and bills of rights which are subject to public 
scrutiny, parliamentary review and judicial process. This idea is fundamental, and 
fundamental to democracy conceived as a process which should bite deeply into the 
structure of state and society. However, any conception of democracy which seeks to 
elaborate it, as I do, as a form of »liberal socialism« or »socialist pluralism« requires 
the limits on »a public power« to be re-assessed in relation to a far broader range of 
issues than has been hitherto commonly presupposed. If people are to be »free and 
equal«, and enjoy equal rights and obligations in and through the political 
community, they must be in a position to enjoy a range of rights not only in principle, 
but also in practice. This entails the specification of a far broader range of rights, with 
a far more profound »cutting edge«, than is allowed typically.
A democracy would be fully worth its name if citizens had the power to be active as 
citizens; that is to say, if citizens were able to enjoy a bundle of rights which allowed 
them to command democratic participation and to treat it as an entitlement. Such a 
»bundle of rights«, it is important to stress, should not be thought of as merely an
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extension of the sphere of accumulated private demands for rights and privileges over 
and against the state, as many liberal thinkers have conceived rights. Nor should it be 
thought of as simply re-distributive welfare measures to alleviate inequalities of 
opportunity, as many of the theorists of the welfare state have interpreted rights. 
Rather, it should be seen as entailed by, and integral to, the very notion of democratic 
rule itself. It is a way of specifying certain socio-economic condition for the possibility 
of democratic participation. If one chooses democracy, one must choose to 
operationalise a radical system of rights.
What would be included in such a system of rights? A constitution and bill of rights 
which enshrined the idea of the »double forms« of citizenship - equal rights and 
equal procedures would specify rights with respect to the processes that determine 
state outcomes. This would involve not only equal rights to cast a vote, but also equal 
rights to enjoy the conditions for political understanding, involvement in collective 
decision-making and the setting of the political agenda. Such broad »state« rights 
would, in turn, entail a broad bundle of social rights linked to reproduction, childcare, 
health and education, as well as economic rights to ensure adequate economic and 
financial resources for a citizen’s autonomy. Without tough social and economic rights, 
rights with respect to the state could not be fully enjoyed; and without state rights new 
forms of inequality of power, wealth and status could systematically disrupt the 
implementation of social and economic liberties.
A system of rights of this type would specify certain responsibilities of the state to 
groups of citizens. The authority of the state would thus, in principle, be clearly 
circumscribed; its capacity for freedom of action bounded. For example, a right to 
reproductive freedom for women would entail making the state responsible not only 
for the medical and social facilities necessary to prevent or assist pregnancy, but also 
for providing the material conditions which would help make the choice to have a 
child a genuinely free one, and thereby, ensure a crucial condition for women if they 
are to be »free and equal«. A right to economic resources for women and men, in 
order that they may be in a position to choose among possible courses of action, would 
oblige the state to be pre-occupied with the ways in which wealth and income can be 
far more equitably distributed. Such resources might be made available through, 
among other things, a guaranteed income for all adults irrespective of whether they 
are engaged in wage, labour or household-labour. Strategies of the this type should be 
treated with some caution; their implications for collective or societal wealth creation 
and distribution are by no means fully clear. However, without a minimum resource 
base of some kind, many people will remain vulnerable and dependent on others, 
unable to exercise fully and independent choice or to pursue different opportunities 
that are formally before them. The »rule of law«, then, must (contra Hayek) involve 
a central concern with distributional question and matters of social justice: anything 
less would hinder the realization of democratic rule.
Accordingly, in this scheme of things, citizenship would impose on the state not only 
the responsibility to ensure formal equality before the law, but also that citizens would 
have the actual capacity to take advantage of opportunities before them. Such a 
responsibility, enshrined in a constitution and bill of rights, would radically enhance
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the ability of citizens to take action against the state to redress unreasonable 
encroachment on liberties. Such a constitution and bill of rights would help tip the 
balance from state to parliament and from parliament to citizens. It would be an 
»empowering« legal system. Of course, »empowerment« would not thereby be 
guaranteed; no legal system alone is able to offer such guarantees. But it would clearly 
specify citizenship rights which could be fought for by individuals, groups and 
movements (wherever pressure could most effectively be mounted), and which could 
be tested in, among other places, open court... This is the model of democratic 
authority, model of Models of Democracy. But its debate still needs a great deal of 
further specification.
